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ARGUMENT 
A. All Relevant Provisions of the APA Require Ground Zero to Indemnify the 
Icon Parties for the Fees and Costs Incurred in Successfully Defending the 
Hoist Fitness Patent Infringement Case, 
The Icon Parties' right to indemnity based upon the Hoist Lawsuit requires 
interpretation of several provisions of the APA. The Appellees have reached their 
conclusions concerning the interpretation of the APA by choosing to focus on selected 
words or phrases in the APA and excluding or minimizing others. When interpreting a 
written contract, a court is required to examine the contract "in its entirety and in 
accordance with its purpose. All of its parts should be given effect insofar as that is 
possible." Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 
1359 (Utah 1987). The court's purpose is to ascertain the intent of the parties, and 
"[e]ach contract provision is to be considered in relation to all of the others, with a view 
toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Plateau Mining Company v. Utah 
Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) (quoting Utah 
Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981)). Courts are required to 
construe written contracts according to their ordinary, plain meaning, harmonizing and 
giving effect to all contract provisions. Elm, Inc. v. MJEnterprises, Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 
863 (Utah Ct. App, 1998). 
1. Section 10.2(a)(i) and the warranty of non-infringement in the APA 
require reimbursement of the fees and costs incurred in successfully 
defending the Hoist Lawsuit. 
Section 10.2(a)(i) of the APA provides for indemnification of the Icon Parties 
concerning representations and warranties made by Ground Zero in the APA. Ground 
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Zero's representations included the promise that the patents transferred to the Icon Parties 
did not infringe on patents of any other parties. Wells Fargo argues that this indemnity 
provision narrowly provides protection to the Icon Parties only in the event actual 
infringement is shown. In other words, Wells Fargo argues that "Ground Zero [did not] 
agree to pay costs incurred by the Icon Parties for claims or threatened claims of 
infringement." (Wells Fargo's Brief, p. 3.) 
In short, the Appellees interpret Section 10.2 to require only that Ground Zero 
indemnify the Icon Parties for fixed liabilities that are incurred as a result of a proven 
breach of Ground Zero's representations and warranties concerning patent infringement. 
On the other hand, the Icon Parties interpret the relevant provisions to provide that 
Ground Zero promised to hold them harmless for any claims or demands (including 
attorneys' fees and costs) that refer to a breach of Ground Zero's representations and 
warranties, including their representation of no patent infringement. 
Appellees reach their interpretation of Section 10.2 based exclusively on the 
phrase "the breach of any representation, warranty, covenant or agreement made by the 
Seller." (APA f 10.2(a)(i).) The difficulty, however, with Appellee's interpretation is 
that it completely ignores the breadth of Ground Zero's promise to indemnify and hold 
the Icon Parties harmless for "Losses" as defined in the APA. The APA expressly 
defines "Losses" to include not only liabilities, but "any demands, claims, complaints, 
actions, suits, proceedings . . ., and reasonable costs and expenses, including . . . 
reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements." (APA p. 4.) Furthermore, Section 10.2 of 
the APA connects the term "Losses" to a breach of the representations and warranties in 
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the APA with the phrases "as a result of, arising out of, relating to or in connection with." 
As set forth in the Icon Parties' opening memorandum, the phrase "relating to" means 
merely to refer to or to have reference to. Thus, Section 10.2 of the APA broadly 
requires Ground Zero to hold the Icon Parties harmless from claims and demands that 
have reference to a breach of Ground Zero's representations and warranties in the APA. 
Those representations and warranties include the representation that there is no patent 
infringement. 
Appellees ignore most of this language with respect to the definition of "Losses." 
Appellees ignore from the definition of "Losses" all terms such as "claims, demands, and 
attorneys' fees" and focus solely on such terms as "obligations or liabilities." With 
respect to the phrase "as a result of, arising out of, relating to or in connection with," 
Appellees rely on the words "as a result o f to the exclusion of the broader language. 
Appellees then argue that Ground Zero only agreed to hold the Icon Parties harmless 
from "liabilities" that are incurred "as a result o f a "breach" of the representation of 
noninfringement. Under Appellees' interpretation of the agreement, words such as 
"claims, demands, etc." and the phrase "relating to" become inoperative and have no 
meaning. Under Appellees' interpretation of the APA, there will never be a time when 
the Icon Parties could be indemnified for claims and demands that refer to a breach of the 
representation of non-infringement. Obviously, given the breadth of the language in 
Section 10.2, the parties did not intend this result. 
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2. Section 10,4 of the APA requires reimbursement of the fees and costs 
incurred in successfully defending the Hoist Lawsuit 
As noted above, Appellees argue that Section 10.2(a)(i) would only require 
reimbursement of the Icon Parties' attorneys' fees and costs in the event that the Icon 
Parties were unsuccessful in defending Hoist's patent infringement claim. Appellees 
argue that Section 10.4 of the APA must be read consistently with Section 10.2(a)(i). 
This argument fails for several reasons. 
First, it should be noted that Section 10.2(a) clearly requires Ground Zero to 
indemnify and hold the Icon Parties harmless from claims and demands, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. In no respect is the Icon Parties' interpretation of 
Section 10.4 inconsistent with Section 10.2. In any event, however, Section 10.4 
separately addresses the topic of "Defense of Claims." The parties to an indemnity 
agreement could reasonably differentiate between a party's duty to provide a defense to a 
claim and the party's duty to pay the claim. These duties need not be co-equal, and 
indeed the duty to defend is typically broader. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Estate of 
Thorkelsen, 27 P.3d 555, \ 22 (Utah 2001). 
Section 10.4 requires the Icon Parties to give notice of a claim for indemnity, and 
outlines the rights and the obligations of Ground Zero and the Icon Parties with respect to 
how claims will be defended. This section clearly outlines the condition for applying the 
defense of claims provisions, stating that it will apply "if any action, lawsuit, proceeding, 
investigation or other claim shall be brought or asserted by any third party which, if 
adversely determined, would entitle [the Icon Parties] to indemnity pursuant to this 
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Article 10." In other words, by its plain language, Section 10.4 applies based merely on 
the nature of a third party's claim as alleged—this section applies if the third party 
alleges a claim which would be paid by Ground Zero if true. Because Hoist sought non-
monetary relief in the form of an injunction and further sought to deny the Icon Parties' 
right to use the patents obtained from Ground Zero, Section 10.4 further specifies that 
Ground Zero "shall not have the right to assume control of such defense and shall pay the 
fees and expenses of counsel retained by [the Icon Parties]." 
Appellees argue that the obligation to pay the Icon Parties' fees and costs under 
Section 10.4 could only apply after a claim is adversely determined. Accepting this 
argument would require the Court to rewrite the whole section. The clear language of the 
section makes it applicable as soon as a claim is made and long before its outcome is 
known. The plain language of this section obligates Ground Zero based solely on the 
nature of the claim as alleged, not on the claim as ultimately determined. 
3. The Icon Parties are entitled to indemnity based upon Section 10.2(vi) of 
the APA. 
Section 10.2(vi) of the APA provides that Ground Zero will hold the Icon Parties 
harmless for claims and demands referring or relating to "any facts, events, 
circumstances, conditions or status arising or existing prior to the Closing .. . and relating 
to [Ground Zero]." Wells Fargo argues that this grounds for indemnity cannot apply 
because the Hoist Lawsuit was a claim for patent infringement, and Section 10.2(a)(i) 
deals specifically with patent infringement. Wells Fargo argues that "the specific 
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warranty as to intellectual property, which was not breached, controls over more general 
warranties." (Wells Fargo's brief, p. 14.) Wells Fargo's argument fails. 
Section 10.2(a)(i) and Section 10.2(a)(vi) are distinct bases for indemnity which 
may or may not overlap, and certainly are not mutually exclusive. The former provides 
for indemnity based upon the substance of a claim. The latter provides for indemnity 
based upon when the facts or events giving rise to the claim occurred. Nothing 
whatsoever in the APA suggests that reliance upon one of these bases for indemnity will 
exclude reliance upon another. 
4. The Icon Parties are entitled to recover the fees and costs incurred in 
defending the Hoist Lawsuit pursuant to the warranty of title provisions. 
In Section 3.6 of the Asset Purchase Agreement, Ground Zero promised that it had 
"good, valid and marketable title to the assets, free and clear of all liens." In Section 10.2 
of the APA, Ground Zero promised to hold the Icon Parties harmless from all claims and 
demands, including fees and costs, that have reference to a breach of the representation 
and warranty of good title. As set forth in the Icon Parties' opening memorandum, 
warranty of good title is breached when a "substantial shadow" is raised as to title. 
In response to the Icon Parties' position, Ground Zero asserts that the warranty of 
good title has no relevance because the Hoist Lawsuit "involved only a claim of patent 
infringement. A claim to the title of assets and for patent infringement are qualitatively 
distinct: a title claim strictly involves ownership while a patent infringement claim entails 
unauthorized use of an invention covered by a valid patent claim." (Ground Zero's brief, 
p. 18.) Ground 2'ero interprets the warranty of marketable title far too narrowly. 
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Contrary to Ground Zero's argument, Utah law defines marketable title as: 
title that "may be 'freely made the subject of resale' and that can be sold at 
a 'fair price to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person of 
reasonable prudence as security for the loan of money.'" Moreover, 
marketable title must be "as free from apparent defects as from actual 
defects, one in which there is no doubt involved as a matter of law or fact. 
Every title is doubtful which invites or exposes the party holding it to 
litigation." 
Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 577-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (italics in original) 
(citations omitted). Obviously, the patent infringement claim brought by Hoist impaired 
the value of the Icon Parties' title to the patent. With the lawsuit pending, title was not 
free from defect. By definition, title is doubtful and is not marketable if the party holding 
title is exposed to litigation. Moreover, whether the adverse litigation succeeds or fails is 
irrelevant since its does not matter whether the defect is "apparent" or "actual." 
Ground Zero's position is not consistent with the definition of marketable title as 
set forth in the case law. 
B. The Warranty of Title Cases Relied Upon by the Icon Parties Support Their 
Position. 
Wells Fargo argues that the warranty of title cases relied upon by the Icon Parties 
are not helpful because all but the case of Catlin Aviation Company v. Equilease Corp., 
626 P.2d 857 (Okla. 1981), involve implied warranties rather than express, and the 
express warranty in the Catlin case is different than the present case. This argument is 
not persuasive. 
In Catlin, the court addressed an express warranty that is very similar to the 
present case. In Catlin, the agreement provided, "We will agree to hold you harmless to 
4588.13^9/11/2008 7 
icon\wel(sfargo\replybnef 
any claim in the event any suit is instituted with respect to any claim which may 
challenge the legality of our title. . . ." Id. at p. 858. In the present case, Ground Zero 
promised to hold the Icon Parties harmless from any claim, demand, complaint, suit, 
proceeding, including attorneys' fees and costs, that have reference to a breach of the 
representations and warranties in the APA. In the APA, Ground Zero warranted that it 
had "good, valid and marketable title to the assets." (APA § 3.6, p. 14.) The scope of the 
warranties in the present case and in the Catlin case are substantially the same. 
All of the warranty cases referenced by the Icon Parties address the covenant of 
title implied in every contract by Section 2-312 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
codified in Utah at UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-312. The statute is titled "Warranty of title 
and against infringement" and provides that the seller warrants that "the title conveyed 
shall be good, and its transfer rightful" and further warrants that "the goods shall be 
delivered free from any security interest or other lien or encumbrance." Id. See, 
American Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking Corp., 268 A.2d 313 (N.J. Ch. 1970) 
(addressing implied warranty of title under the UCC); Wright v. Vickaryous, 611 P.2d 20 
(Ak. 1980) (addressing implied warranty under the UCC); Ricklefs v. demons, 531 P.2d 
94 (Kan. 1975) (addressing express contractual warranty and implied warranty under the 
UCC). The title of warranty which the UCC implies in sales contracts is substantially the 
same as the warranty of title found in the APA. In the APA, Ground Zero warrants that it 
"has good, valid and marketable title to the assets, free and clear of all liens." (APA § 
3.6, p. 14.) Section 3.6 of the APA expressly includes a warranty of "marketable title" 
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and Section 2-312 of the UCC similarly is intended to embody "a marketable title 
concept." Wright, 611 P.2d at 21. 
The warranty of title cases relied upon by the Icon Parties make clear that the 
warranty of title is breached as follows: "[t]he mere casting of a substantial shadow over 
his title, regardless of the ultimate outcome, is sufficient to violate a warranty of good 
title." American Container Corp., 268 A.2d at 318. Appellees have not cited a single 
case that refutes this position. 
As set forth in the Icon Parties' opening memorandum, the natural consequence of 
such a breach of warranty is the necessity of hiring counsel and incurring attorneys' fees 
and costs to eliminate the shadow over title. More importantly, in the present case, 
Ground Zero expressly promised to hold the Icon Parties harmless for claims, demands, 
suits, proceedings and attorneys' fees and costs that relate to a breach of the 
representations and warranties in the APA, including the warranty of good title. These 
provisions allow the Icon Parties to recover the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
removing the blemish on title caused by the Hoist Fitness claim. Hoist's claim of patent 
infringement? without regard to its outcome, qualifies as a breach of the warranty of 
marketable title. 
C. The Indemnity Cases Relied Upon by the Icon Parties Support Their Position. 
Appellees argue that the indemnity cases relied upon by the Icon Parties are 
distinguishable and do not support their position because, unlike the present case, these 
cases address "recovery of attorneys' fees and costs incurred only in defending an 
indemnified claim." (Wells Fargo's brief, p. 15.) 
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Wells Fargo does not clearly identify what it means by an "indemnified claim." 
Presumably, Wells Fargo is again relying upon its argument that Ground Zero only 
promised to provide indemnity in the event an adverse claim is successful. As noted 
above, that is contrary to the plain language of the APA. 
Wells Fargo promised in the APA that its intellectual property did not infringe 
upon the patents of third parties and further warranted that it was transferring good title to 
the Icon Parties. Wells Fargo also agreed to hold the Icon Parties harmless from any 
claims that might arise from facts or circumstances existing prior to the APA. The claim 
of Hoist Fitness fell squarely within the scope of the indemnity provisions because Hoist 
Fitness alleged a claim which, if true, must be paid by Ground Zero. Accordingly, the 
claim of Hoist was clearly an "indemnified claim." 
The indemnity cases relied upon by the Icon Parties all have similarities and 
analyses that are helpful to the Court in the present case. For example, in the case of 
Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. SS Herms, 765 F.2d 306 (2nd Cir. 1985), the court construed 
contractual indemnity language quite similar to the indemnity language in the present 
case. In Peter Fabrics, the agreement provided that the indemnifying party "will defend, 
indemnify and hold harmless [the indemnified party] from and against all claims, causes 
of action, suits, losses, damages, liabilities and expenses, including but not limited to 
costs of suit and attorneys' fees." Id. at 313. In Peter Fabrics, the court further noted the 
"established" rule that an indemnitee may recover the attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
in defending an indemnified claim. The court further stressed that "reimbursement of 
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such fees is presumed to have been the intent of the [contract] draftsman unless the 
agreement explicitly says otherwise." Id. at 315. 
None of these cases stand for the proposition, as urged by Appellees, that 
attorneys' fees and costs can be recovered only if the underlying claim is successful. 
Rather, these cases stand for the widely recognized principle, as articulated in Peter 
Fabrics, that the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending an indemnified claim are 
recoverable. See, Flunker v. United States, 528 F.2d 239, 246 (9th Cir. 1975) ("courts 
allow indemnitees to collect from the indemnitor reasonable and necessary counsel fees 
and legal expenses incurred in defending"); Duty Free Shoppers Group Ltd. v. State, 111 
P.2d 649, 654 (Ak. 1989) ("When an indemnity clause includes a 'hold harmless' 
provision, the indemnitee is entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
defending the underlying claim. . . ."). Whether the underlying indemnified claim is 
successful is irrelevant. Appellees have not cited a single case that refutes this position. 
As the court noted in Piedmont Equipment Co. v. Eberhard Manufacturing, 665 
P.2d 256, 259 (Nev. 1983), "[a]n indemnitee is not 'held harmless' pursuant to an express 
or implied indemnity agreement if it must incur costs and attorneys' fees to vindicate its 
rights." An indemnitee vindicates its rights by a successful defense, and as noted in 
Piedmont, complete vindication is only possible when the indemnitor pays the fees and 
costs of the defense. 
Appellees also attempt to distinguish the Utah cases of James Constructors, Inc. v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and Pavoni v. Nielsen, 999 P.2d 
595 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). Appellees assert that these cases stand for the proposition that 
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reimbursement of defense costs may only be recovered if the written agreement expressly 
so states. The point raised by Appellees is moot inasmuch as the APA very clearly and 
expressly requires Ground Zero to hold the Icon Parties harmless from attorneys' fees, 
costs, claims, demands, suits and proceedings. In addition, Appellees misread these 
cases. James Constructors and Pavoni address two issues which Appellees fail to 
recognize and distinguish: 1) whether the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending 
an indemnified claim are recoverable; and 2) whether the attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in enforcing the indemnity agreement against the indemnitor are recoverable. 
James Constructors cites with approval and relies upon the Peter Fabrics case, which 
stated that the right to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against an 
indemnified claim are recoverable "unless the agreement explicitly says otherwise." 
Peter Fabrics, 765 F.2d at 315. James Constructors and Pavoni only state that the 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in enforcing the indemnity agreement against the 
indemnifying party are not recoverable unless the agreement expressly so provides. 
D. The Broad Indemnity Provisions of the APA Require Ground Zero to Hold 
the Icon Parties Harmless for Counterclaims. 
Wells Fargo has argued that the Icon Parties are not entitled to indemnity because 
they "brought their own declaratory judgment action rather than 'defending' against a 
claim by Hoist." (Wells Fargo Brief, p. 17.) It is true that after careful investigation of 
the demand made by Hoist Fitness, the Icon Parties concluded that they could either wait 
and be sued in a forum of Hoist's choosing or initiate their own declaratory action in 
Utah at less cost. Thus, the Icon Parties filed the declaratory action in Utah seeking a 
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resolution of the claims and demands made by Hoist Fitness that the Icon Parties' patent 
(obtained from Ground Zero) infringed on Hoist's patent. Hoist responded with a 
counterclaim alleging patent infringement. 
Any argument, however, that the Icon Parties are not entitled to be held harmless 
simply because they are labeled as plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants in that action is 
groundless. The APA requires Ground Zero to hold the Icon Parties harmless from "any 
demands, claims, complaints, actions, suits, proceedings, investigations . . . and 
reasonable costs and expenses, including . . . reasonable attorneys' fees and 
disbursements." (See APA p. 4, and § 10.2 at p. 36.) Hoist Fitness alleged that the patent 
obtained by the Icon Parties from Ground Zero infringed on Hoist's patent. As a matter 
of substance, this claim falls squarely within the hold harmless obligations of the APA. 
The APA in no respect limits its application based upon the procedural mechanism used 
by a third party to assert its claim, and it would make no sense to do so. 
E. The Covenant Not to Sue is Not a Basis for the Dismissal of the Icon Parties' 
Claims. 
In reliance upon a covenant not to sue entered into by the Icon Parties and Ground 
Zero in December 2004, Ground Zero argues that the trial court properly dismissed the 
Icon Parties' claims against Ground Zero. This argument is in error. 
It should first be noted that the trial court did not dismiss the Icon Parties' claims 
against Ground Zero based upon the covenant not to sue. Although the trial court did not 
specify the reasons for dismissing claims specifically against Ground Zero, presumably 
the dismissal was based upon the same grounds as dismissal of the claims against Wells 
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Fargo. There is a very good reason why the trial court did not rely upon the covenant not 
to sue—the covenant not to sue by its plain language does not entitle Ground Zero to 
dismissal of the [con Parties' claims. 
The covenant not to sue was entered into by Ground Zero and the Icon Parties in 
December 2004, many months after this litigation began. The covenant not to sue 
provides that the Icon Parties would be limited to recovery from Wells Fargo of the funds 
held in escrow, and that the Icon Parties would not seek to collect from Ground Zero any 
judgment obtained against Ground Zero. However, the plain language of the covenant 
not to sue provides that the Icon Parties were not required to dismiss any claims against 
Ground Zero: 
The parties agree and acknowledge that it may be necessary for Icon to 
pursue its claims against Simonson Enterprises in the Utah lawsuit so as not 
to compromise Icon's claims against Wells Fargo Bank. The parties agree 
and acknowledge that Icon will have sole discretion whether to maintain, 
amend, or dismiss Icon's claims against Simonson Enterprises in the Utah 
lawsuit solely to perfect its claims against Wells Fargo Bank. 
(Covenant Not to Sue, ^ 5, Exhibit A to Ground Zero's brief.) Ground Zero's request 
that claims against it be dismissed based upon the covenant not to sue is directly contrary 
to the very clear language of the document. 
Ground Zero states in its brief that the Icon Parties indicated their willingness to 
allow dismissal of their claims against Ground Zero as long as certain conditions could be 
satisfied. There is no indication, however, that any of those conditions were satisfied or 
agreed to between Ground Zero and the Icon Parties. The statements attributed to the 
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Icon Parties by Ground Zero in its brief are nothing more than an invitation to discuss 
settlement, which obviously never occurred. 
F. The Undisputed Facts Show That But for Wells Fargo's Wrongful Release of 
the Escrow Fund, the Icon Parties Would Have Been Able to Make a Claim 
Against the Fund Based Upon the Znetix Lawsuit. 
Appellees argue that the Icon Parties' claim against the escrow fund based upon 
the Znetix Lawsuit was untimely for two reasons. First, they assert that the escrow 
ceased to exist in December 2001, when Wells Fargo wrongfully released the funds, and 
therefore the Icon Parties have no right to relief against Wells Fargo. Second, they assert 
that the escrow funds should have been released no later than February 2003, when the 
federal district court ruled in the Hoist Lawsuit that there was no patent infringement. 
These arguments are not persuasive. 
Appellees may be correct as a technical matter when they assert that no claim 
could be made against the escrow fund after the funds were wrongfully released. This 
assertion, however, is merely an attempt to confuse the issues and completely misses the 
mark.1 The Complaint in this matter states that Wells Fargo wrongfully released the 
escrow fund, and seeks damages from Wells Fargo as a result of the breach. The Icon 
Parties are entitled to a remedy that would place them in the position they would have 
been in had Wells Fargo not breached the IEA. See, Kniffin v. Colo. Western 
Development, 622 P.2d 586, 591 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). Had Wells Fargo not wrongfully 
1
 It should be noted that after Wells Fargo breached the IEA and released the escrow funds, the Icon Parties had no 
further obligation to comply with any provisions of the IEA. Cornerstone Group v. Wheat Ridge, 151 P.3d 601, 608 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (Material breach by one party excused performance from the other); Saunders v. Sharp, 840 
P.2d 796, 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (Party who substantially breaches a contract cannot maintain an action against 
the other party for non-performance). 
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released the escrow, the Icon Parties would have been able to assert and recover claims 
against the escrow based both on the Znetix Lawsuit and the Hoist Lawsuit. 
The IEA permits the Icon Parties to make a claim against the escrow "at any time 
on or prior to the teimination" of the IEA. (IEA, § 5(b)(ii).) Thus, in order to assess 
whether the Icon Parties would have been able to make a claim against the escrow fund 
based upon the Znetix Lawsuit, it must be determined when the IEA would have properly 
terminated but for Wells Fargo's wrongful conduct. The trial court did not address the 
issue, and the Appellees offer no plausible argument for the IEA to terminate prior to the 
time when the Icon Parties would have been able to make a claim based upon the Znetix 
Lawsuit. 
Appellees argue that the IEA would have terminated no later than February 2003, 
when the federal district court determined that the Hoist patent did not infringe upon the 
Icon Parties' patent. Appellees assert that as of that time the Icon Parties' claim for 
indemnity based upon the Hoist Lawsuit was "invalid." Appellees presume that as of that 
time this claim for indemnity was "invalid" because, according to their argument, the 
Icon Parties would not be entitled to recover the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
successfully defending the Hoist claim of patent infringement. The Appellees' argument 
ignores that the order in the Hoist Lawsuit did not become final until May 11, 2003. 
More importantly, the Appellees' argument utterly ignores the provisions of the IEA, 
with which Wells Fargo is required to strictly comply. 
The IEA includes procedures for determining the validity of a claim for indemnity. 
The IEA provides that the validity of a claim would be determined, and the escrow funds 
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thereby released, pursuant to written instructions signed by the Icon Parties and Ground 
Zero or a final, nonappealable order from a court having jurisdiction over the claim of 
indemnification. (IEA § 5(b)(iv).) Neither of these events has ever occurred. 
The federal court in the Hoist Lawsuit did not make any findings about whether 
the Icon Parties were entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in successfully 
defending the Hoist claim of patent infringement. The federal court in the Hoist Lawsuit 
did not in any fashion address whether the claim for indemnity based on the Hoist 
Lawsuit is valid. The present lawsuit was filed for the purpose of adjudicating the 
validity of that claim. Had the federal court in the Hoist Lawsuit already done so, this 
case would have been dismissed on the grounds of res judicata before answers were 
filed. Neither Wells Fargo nor Ground Zero filed a motion to dismiss because both knew 
full well that the federal court did not adjudicate any claim for indemnity. The IEA also 
would not have permitted Wells Fargo or Ground Zero to unilaterally determine the 
validity of the Icon Parties' claim for indemnity based upon the Hoist Lawsuit and obtain 
the release of the funds in February 2003. 
The present lawsuit was filed for the purpose of obtaining a judicial determination 
of whether the Icon Parties are entitled to be indemnified for the attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in defending the Hoist claim of patent infringement. Not until the trial court 
ruled in this matter was there ever any determination of the validity of the Icon Parties' 
claim, and even that decision is not yet final because of this appeal. Obviously, the Icon 
Parties would have had ample opportunity to assert a claim for indemnity based upon the 
Znetix Lawsuit had Wells Fargo not wrongfully released the funds. 
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G. The Hoist Buyer's Certificate Did Not State a Claim Conditioned Upon 
Success of the Hoist Patent Infringement Claim, and the Language of the 
Claim is Irrelevant Since it was Subject to Amendment. 
Appellees argue that the trial court properly dismissed the Icon Parties' claim for 
indemnity with respect to the Hoist Fitness lawsuit because the Hoist Buyer's Certificate 
stated a claim that was conditioned upon Hoist's successful prosecution of its patent 
infringement claim. According to Appellees, since Hoist's patent infringement claims 
were ultimately defeated, there is no right to recover the attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred in defense because of the language of the Hoist Buyer's Certificate. 
This claim fails because the Hoist Buyer's Certificate is not conditional in nature. 
The Hoist Buyer's Certificate merely gave notice of Hoist's pending claim, in satisfaction 
of Section 10.4 of the APA. Section 10.4 required that "if any action, lawsuit, 
proceeding, investigation or other claim shall be brought or asserted by any third party 
which, if adversely determined, would entitle [the Icon Parties] to indemnity pursuant to 
this Article 10, [Ihe Icon Parties] shall promptly notify [Ground Zero]. . . ." To that end, 
when the Icon Parties sent the Hoist Buyer's Certificate, they merely complied with 
Section 10.4, stating, "In the event that the Hoist claim of infringement is successfully 
prosecuted, such will render the foregoing Seller representation to be inaccurate and will 
subject Seller to the indemnification obligation. . . ." (Hoist Buyer's Certificate, ROA 
1162, Exhibit 3 to the Icon Parties' brief.) In short, the Hoist Buyer's Certificate merely 
informed Ground Zero that Hoist's claim fell within the scope of the APA because, if 
successful, it must be paid by Ground Zero. In no respect does the Hoist Buyer's 
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Certificate waive the right to recover attorneys' fees and costs in the event the Icon 
Parties are successful in defeating Hoist's claim. 
In any event, the language of the Hoist Buyer's Certificate in the context of this 
case is irrelevant. Wells Fargo's arguments concerning the language in the certificate is 
nothing more than an after-the-fact attempt to avoid responsibility for its admitted 
dereliction of duty in releasing the escrow funds while an unresolved claim for indemnity 
was pending. Although the APA requires the Icon Parties to notify Ground Zero of an 
indemnity claim, it expressly states that "failure to so notify [Ground Zero] shall not 
relieve [Ground Zero] of its or his obligations hereunder except to the extent such failure 
shall have prejudiced [Ground Zero]." (APA § 10.4.) 
Nothing in the IE A would have allowed Wells Fargo to review the Hoist Buyer's 
Certificate and unilaterally release the escrow funds. As an escrow agent, Wells Fargo 
owed fiduciary duties to all parties to the escrow, and its duty included an obligation to 
communicate pertinent information to all parties. Kir by v. Palos Verdes Escrow 
Company, 183 Cal App. 3d 57, 64 (Cal. App. 1986), overruled on other grounds by 
Summit Financial v. Continental Lawyers Title, 41 P.3d 548 (Cal. 2002). Among other 
things, Wells Fargo could never have released the funds without at a minimum first 
communicating with the Icon Parties. That would have allowed the Icon Parties ample 
opportunity to clarify or amend the Hoist Buyer's Certificate to the extent necessary. 
Because no prejudice would result to anyone from such clarification or amendment, it 
would be permissible under the APA. At least there are issues of fact with respect to this 
question. 
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The precise language of the Hoist Buyer's Certificate is simply irrelevant. Wells 
Fargo failed even to read it before releasing the escrow. The Certificate is only relevant 
in this case in three ways: 1) It evidences that a claim was made to the escrow; 2) Until 
the validity of the claim was determined as outlined in the IE A, Wells Fargo was required 
to hold the escrow fund; and 3) The validity of the indemnity claim in the Certificate has 
never been resolved by agreement of the parties or by a final, non-appealable order of any 
court. As such, Wells Fargo, had it acted properly, would still be holding the escrow 
fund today. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the dismissal of the Icon 
Parties' claims. 
DATED this / 1 ^ day of September, 2008. 
KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
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